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Abstract 
Conceptual change can be a challenging process, particularly in science education 
where many of the concepts are complex, controversial, or counter-intuitive.  Yet, 
conceptual change is fundamental to science learning, which suggests science 
educators and science education researchers need models to effectively address and 
investigate conceptual change.  Consideration of the current research and extant 
models of conceptual change reflect a need for a holistic, comprehensive, and 
dynamic model of conceptual change.  In response, we developed the Dynamic 
Model of Conceptual Change (DMCC), which uses multiple lines of research that 
explore the variables influencing conceptual change and the dynamic interactions 
that take place during the conceptual change process in science teaching and 
learning.  Unique to the DMCC is the potential for iterations, regression, enter and 
exit points at various stages of the conceptual change process, and the influences of 
message recognition, message engagement and processing, and the nature of the 
resulting conceptual change.  The DMCC contains elements from extant models 
along with previously un-emphasized influential conceptual change variables such 
as culture, society, attitude, practices, and personal epistemology.  We constructed 
the DMCC to provide science educators and researchers a more holistic framework 
for exploring conceptual change in science instruction and learning. 
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Resumen 
El cambio conceptual puede ser un proceso desafiante, particularmente en la 
educación de las ciencias, donde muchos de los conceptos son complejos, 
controvertidos o contra-intuitivos. Sin embargo, es fundamental para el aprendizaje 
de las ciencias, lo que sugiere que los educadores e investigadores necesitan 
modelos para abordar e investigarlo de manera efectiva. La investigación actual y 
los modelos existentes de cambio conceptual reflejan la necesidad de un modelo 
holístico, integral y dinámico. Desarrollamos el Modelo Dinámico de Cambio 
Conceptual (DMCC), que utiliza múltiples líneas de investigación que exploran las 
variables que influyen y las interacciones dinámicas que tienen lugar durante el 
proceso de cambio conceptual en la enseñanza y el aprendizaje de la ciencia. Único 
para el DMCC es el potencial de iteraciones, regresión, puntos de entrada y salida en 
varias etapas del proceso, y las influencias del reconocimiento y procesamiento de 
mensajes, compromiso y la naturaleza del cambio conceptual resultante. El DMCC 
contiene elementos de modelos existentes junto con variables influyentes de 
cambios conceptuales sin énfasis como la cultura, la sociedad, la actitud, las 
prácticas y la epistemología personal. Construimos el DMCC para proporcionar a 
los educadores e investigadores de ciencias un marco más holístico para explorar el 
cambio conceptual en la enseñanza y el aprendizaje de la ciencia. 
Palabras clave: Cambio conceptual, dinámico, sistema abierto, enseñanza y aprendizaje
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onceptual change, or the restructuring of existing knowledge, has 
been studied extensively in science education where students often 
hold incorrect or naïve conceptions about physics, chemistry, 
astronomy, engineering, and other scientific phenomena that conflict with 
what students learn in school (Sinatra, 2005).  Conceptual change is 
particularly paramount in science education because of the many 
misconceptions that students develop due to intuitive thinking, everyday life 
experiences, movies and TV shows, and superficial science instruction 
(Garrison & Bentley, 1990).  For decades, the research on conceptual change 
focused on the cognitive and developmental factors influencing changes in 
student knowledge.  In the last 30 years, this research has shifted to consider 
the impact of motivation, emotions, contextual and sociocultural variables 
on conceptual change (Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle, 1993).  Specifically, 
following the formalized proposal of a theory of conceptual change by 
Posner et al. (1982), there has been considerable research examining 
conceptual change and the influence of culture and society (Moje & 
Shepardson, 1998; Vosniadou, 1994), emotions (Gregoire, 2003), 
epistemological beliefs (Windschitl, 1995), motivation (Pintrich, Marx, & 
Boyle, 1993), and personal practices and beliefs (Chi, 2008).   
Lacking in the literature is a comprehensive, holistic model that 
integrates the array of variables that have been empirically and theoretically 
linked to conceptual change.  While the conceptual change models of 
researchers such as Gregoire (2003), Dole and Sinatra (1998), Murphy 
(2007), and Smith, diSessa, and Roschelle, (1994) address various influences 
on the process, they tend to be either contextualized (e.g. Gregoire’s focus 
on teachers), or exclude variables that have recently been found to be 
associated with conceptual change.  In addition, extant models of conceptual 
change fall short in illustrating how the array of variables linked to 
conceptual change may interact, how difficult it can be to illicit or maintain 
conceptual change, and the many ways conceptual change may or may not 
occur.  Thus, we responded to the need for an updated, inclusive, and 
comprehensive model of conceptual change.  Our model includes many 
variables linked to conceptual change in the research and does so by 
graphically presenting the conceptual change process as dynamic, complex, 
iterative, and multi-level in nature.  
C 
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Before we present a new model of conceptual change, the Dynamic 
Model of Conceptual Change (DMCC), we offer a definition of conceptual 
change and explore a subset of existing conceptual change models.  We 
provide a critique of the extant models and the potential limitations due to a 
growing understanding of conceptual change and the broadening of 
recognized variables influencing conceptual change.  We then describe the 
processes and constructs of the DMCC and the empirical and theoretical 
research upon which the DMCC was developed.  We close with implications 
for research and describe how the DMCC may be used by science education 
researchers to study conceptual change. 
 
Defining Conceptual Change 
Conceptual change has been defined in numerous ways.  For example, from 
a Piagetian perspective, conceptual change involves going through a process 
of accommodation, a process in which schema are changed when learners 
are exposed to new information that does not fit with their existing 
conceptions (Piaget, 1970).  It is important to keep in mind that in 
accommodation, new schemas do not supersede or supplant prior schema, as 
people may simultaneously hold multiple schemas to explain phenomenon 
(Carey, 1985; Shtulman, 2009).  Rather, the new schema holds greater 
explanatory power or is more aligned with the experienced situation and 
therefore is more likely to be considered and to become the dominant 
conception used to explain phenomenon in a given situation or context.  
Thus, conceptual change is defined in ways that suggest that schema are 
modified (or restructured) leading to a change in conceptions or as processes 
of new schema formation, but yet that individuals retain their prior schemas.  
We take the position that conceptual change is building on an existing 
conception to form a new explanation while retaining explanation of the 
original extant conception.  The result of the modification becomes the 
preferred conception while the original conception is retained and can still 
be relied up to explain phenomenon, as people may hold multiple 
conceptions to explain a specific phenomenon (Ohlsson, 2009; Shtulman, 
2009). 
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Many definitions and models of conceptual change suggest that when 
new conceptions are formed they become dominant and prior conceptions 
are no longer considered, or even potentially lost (Dole & Sinatra, 1998; 
Posner et al., 1982).  In such models, conceptions are restructured (Dole & 
Sinatra, 1998), resulting in newly formed conceptions that supersede prior 
conceptions.  Other conceptual change researchers, including Vosniadou 
(1994) view conceptual change as the restructuring of a personal “theory” or 
simply a “theory change.”  Vosniadou argues that the change is a 
combination of cognitive processes of the individual and the social and 
environmental conditions that they experience.  This perspective suggests 
that conceptions morph during the process of change rather than an 
individual developing new conceptions and retaining prior conceptions.  In 
addition, Vosniadou recognizes the influence of society and environment on 
the learner and the process of conceptual change.   
We contend that the process of “conceptual change” likely does not 
involve reconstruction of a single chunk of knowledge.  Rather, we embrace 
the notion that learners may retain numerous conceptions of phenomenon 
with the ability to accurately recall and actually apply these various 
conceptions effectively (Smith, diSessa, & Roschelle, 1994).  Thus, we 
support the position of Ohlsson (2009) and maintain that rather than going 
through a process of restructuring conceptions, learners instead adopt and 
form the new conceptions as their dominant conception to explain 
phenomenon while effectively maintaining prior conceptions in a dormant or 
suppressed state.  Our position of learners potentially holding multiple and 
competing conceptions, and while it had been postulated (Carey, 1985; 
Ohlsson, 2009; Shtulman, 2009), the idea of multiple conceptions is not 
commonly emphasized in existing conceptual change models. 
 
Challenges with Conceptual Change 
The potential to simultaneously hold multiple conceptions can be used to 
explain the challenges with conceptual change.  In knowledge acquisition, 
new information is learned and typically does not compete with existing 
conceptions.  However, if a learner holds a conception and then forms a new 
conception of the same phenomena, the conceptions may complete or 
interfere with future learning and each may be reinforced by different 
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experiences or phenomenon – which in part can explain the challenges 
associated with conceptual change teaching and learning.  For example, if a 
student holds no prior conceptions of batteries, learning how batteries work 
would not require the suppression of a prior conception.  However, students 
may hold the concept that batteries are reservoirs of electrons, that get “used 
up” over time and then learns that batteries involve redox reactions that free 
up electrons that can flow in a circuit.  The students’ experiences with older 
batteries in a flashlight that is dimly lit may reinforce the reservoir 
conception by supporting the perception that the light is dim due to electrons 
in the battery being used up.  Thus, when faced with having to provide an 
explanation of batteries, the student may rely on and apply multiple 
conceptions of how batteries work to explain different conditions or 
processes that are based on the same phenomenon.  
 
Extant Models of Conceptual Change 
In a seminal model of learners’ conceptual change, Posner et al. (1982) 
posited the following four conditions that facilitate conceptual change: 
helping a learner become aware of the inadequacies in an existing 
conception (dissatisfaction); helping a learner find an appreciation for how a 
new or appropriate concept works (intelligible); persuading the learner to 
perceive the new concept to be a reasonable explanation of the phenomena 
(plausibility); and, allowing the learner to be able to apply the new concept 
to other areas of inquiry (fruitfulness).  Yet in revisiting their early theory of 
conceptual change, Strike and Posner (1992) acknowledge that their initial 
formulation of their conceptual change theory was overly rational, falling 
short in taking into account factors that might be part of a learner’s 
conceptual ecology (i.e. “motives and goals”).  “Accordingly, it is proposed 
that the way students approach their learning would affect how they process 
the conflictual information and subsequent conceptual change” (Chan, 
Burtis, & Bereiter, 1997, p. 4). 
 With the emergence of the Cognitive Reconstruction of Knowledge 
Model (CRKM) (Dole & Sinatra, 1998), characteristics of the learner 
(including their motivation) and characteristics of the message are illustrated 
as being contributing factors in facilitating conceptual change.  In the 
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CRKM learner characteristics interact with message characteristics in a 
manner that activates a level of engagement along a continuum; whereby 
high engagement is hypothesized to beget strong conceptual change, if any, 
and low engagement would beget weak or no conceptual change.  It is the 
engagement continuum that makes the CRKM unique, because it infers that 
a highly engaged learner is more likely to pay attention to new information, 
be cognizant of inadequacies to their prior conceptions (dissatisfaction), and 
more active in trying to resolve cognitive conflicts.  Though contemporary at 
the time, and more comprehensive than the conditions proposed by Strike 
and colleagues (1982), the CRKM has some limitations due to the lack of 
consideration of cultural and societal influences, learner emotions, and 
learner practices.  
 Since Dole and Sinatra’s (1998) proposal of the CRKM, two 
additional conceptual change models have been highlighted in the 
contemporary educational psychology literature, including Gregoire’s (2003) 
Cognitive-Affective Model of Conceptual Change (CAMCC) and Murphy’s 
(2007) Belief and Knowledge Acquisition and Change Framework.  Both 
models are in part informed by the CRKM; however, unlike the CRKM, the 
two models place greater emphasis on specific [social] cognitive constructs 
of learning, without an engagement continuum nor substantial attention to 
the characteristics of the message.  Gregoire’s CAMCC takes into account 
learner motivation in conjunction with whether the learner appraises a 
message as being a challenge or a threat.  The CAMCC reflects Gregoire’s 
(2003) assessment of teachers’ reactions to the consideration of instructional 
reforms that challenge their existing beliefs, for which learners (in this case 
teachers) are presented with a message concerning a conflicting belief.  In 
the CAMCC, Gregoire proposes that learners who appraise a message in a 
stressful way will eventually perceive the conflicting information as a 
challenge or threat to their existing beliefs.  Those who appraise the 
information as a challenge are likely to respond with an approach intention, 
process the new information systematically, and perhaps experience “true 
conceptual change;” whereas those who appraise the new information as a 
threat are likely to respond with an avoidance intention, rashly process the 
new information, and at best experience superficial belief change, if any.  
The CAMCC highlights learners’ affective responses to new information in 
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the conceptual change process.  The model, however, was not meant to be a 
comprehensive model of conceptual change, limiting the ability to generalize 
or apply the model to other diverse conceptual contexts or in conjunction 
with other influential constructs.  Regardless, the CAMCC provides 
justification for including affect and emotions as elements influencing the 
process of conceptual change. 
 Murphy’s (2007) Belief and Knowledge Acquisition and Change 
Framework was the first published conceptual change model to explicitly 
address the hypothesized relationship between belief change and conceptual 
change.  Murphy (2007) argues that following initial exposures to a new 
piece of information, learners will consider the message using either the 
peripheral (heuristic processing) or central route (deep cognitive processing), 
in alignment with dual process models of persuasion (Petty & Brinol, 2015; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  
 Through her model Murphy (2007) proposes several important 
implications that add to our knowledge and understanding of conceptual 
change.  First, Murphy posits a relationship between belief change and 
conceptual change as a dynamic and interactive process.  Related, the model 
also explicitly includes affect and epistemological beliefs as influential for 
conceptual change, which is supported by other research (Mason, Gava, & 
Boldrin, 2008; Patrick & Pintrich, 2001; Qian & Alverman, 2000).  
However, as criticism, Murphy did not include many variables in the model 
that are considered to be influential for conceptual change such as 
motivation and social/cultural contexts.  The exclusion was likely intentional 
given the specific focus on how knowledge and belief interact during 
conceptual change.  An additional criticism of the model is the lack of 
inclusion of engagement as an important factor in the change process – a 
variable that has been documented to be integral to conceptual change (Dole 
& Sinatra, 1998; Heddy & Sinatra, 2013).  Regardless, while Murphy’s 
(2007) model includes elements not present in other models (e.g. the 
association between belief and conceptual development) we argue that the 
complexity of conceptual change necessitates the inclusion of multiple 
variables that are absent from Murphy’s (2007) model.  
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 Taking a very different direction for explaining conceptual change, 
diSessa (1993) argues that individuals form fragments of knowledge that 
they use to develop conceptions and describe phenomenon.  The fragments – 
labeled as phenomenological primitives or p-prims - develop based on 
experience and observation.  While the p-prims may be useful in explaining 
phenomenon, a learner relying on his/her p-prims to explain concepts 
typically provides rudimentary and incomplete explanations of concepts.  
Over time, as learners gain deeper knowledge of concepts their explanation 
of phenomenon become more complex and comprehensive.  Different from 
other models of conceptual change, diSessa’s model suggests that conceptual 
change is a progressive process of gaining deeper and more complete 
explanations of phenomenon.  Lacking from diSessa’s model are the 
influences on conceptual change, such as motivation, culture, attitudes, and 
interest.  Further, missing from the model is an explanation for why and how 
the prior conceptions are retained when new more complete explanations are 
formed.  
 Over the three decades since Posner et al.’s (1982) proposed model of 
conceptual change, many notable contributions have been made to the 
literature concerning conceptual change, many of which have highlighted 
components that were absent in previous models.  Therefore, we are 
responding to the need to update the model of conceptual change so that 
research concerning conceptual change is consistent in its operationalization, 
reporting of findings, and the field of conceptual change in science education 
can more uniformly advance.  
 
Elements Critical to Dynamic Model of Conceptual Change 
 
In an effort to reconcile the limited scope of extant models of conceptual 
change and an increased addition of an array of variables associated with 
learning, we developed the Dynamic Model of Conceptual Change (DMCC).  
In the development of the model we took into consideration both the 
variables that influence conceptual change (e.g., emotions, culture) and the 
processes (e.g., regression to further consideration, drift from position, 
context of consideration) that occur.  Prior to presenting the DMCC we 
explore the processes and constructs that influence conceptual change, 
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providing a justification for their inclusion in our model. We also take into 
consideration facets from extant models, missing elements related to 




Elements Retained from Previous Conceptual Change Models 
Motivation.  Motivation is an integral component when considering factors 
that influence the conceptual change process and inarguably should be 
included in any conceptual change model.  We argue that motivation is an 
expression of the autonomy of individuals in their determination to consider 
(or not) alterative explanations and form new conceptions.  Motivation is 
linked to conceptual change in science learning (Hynd, Alvermann, & Qian, 
1997; Jones, Howe, & Rua, 2000; Laukenmann, Bleicher, Fub, Glaser-
Zikuda, Marying, & von Rhoneck, 2003; Linnenbrink & Pintrich; 2002; 
Taasoobshirazi & Sinatra, 2011; Taasoobshirazi, Heddy, Bailey, & Farley, 
2016; Weaver, 1998).  The specific components of motivation we considered 
in our conceptual change model that are aligned with self- determined 
decision making to engage in conceptual change processes are personal 
relevance (Heddy & Sinatra, 2013; Sinatra, 2005), task-value (Johnson & 
Sinatra, 2013; Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle, 1993), and goal orientation (Johnson 
& Sinatra, 2014; Linnenbrink & Pintrich, 2002).  However, operationally 
defining and considering the multifaceted nature of motivation is essential 
when investigating this construct (Murphy & Alexander, 2000).   
 In the DMCC we operationalized motivation to be the determination 
to take action to engage cognitively, emotionally and behaviorally in 
conceptual change processes.  Influencing the motivation and subsequent 
determination to engage are personal perceptions of: 1) relevance, 2) task-
value, and 3) learning goals.  Personal relevance is associated with 
individual determination of the relatedness of learning content to their 
personal interest (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981; Pintrich, Marx, & 
Boyle, 1993).  Thus, in the conceptual change process individuals may learn 
about a topic such as climate change, and recognize that they are interested 
in the topic and that they find it personally relevant, which can impact their 
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determination to engage in exploring the concepts.  This engagement, 
according to Sinatra (2005), increases the likelihood of conceptual change.   
Task-value refers to learners’ perceptions of the interest, relatedness, 
usefulness, and cost of a task, which influences their motivation (Bong, 
2004; Eccles & Wigfield, 2002).  There are currently four classifications of 
task-value, which include intrinsic value (e.g. interest), attainment value 
(e.g. identity related), utility value (e.g. usefulness), and cost (e.g. effort that 
the task takes; Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Eccles et al., 2003; Wigfield, 1994).  
The more value that individuals place on a task or topic, the more likely they 
are to experience conceptual change (Johnson & Sinatra, 2013; Jones, 
Johnson, & Campbell, 2015).   
We consider goal-orientation as a critical component of motivation 
related to conceptual change due to the possibility of providing reason for 
engaging (or not) in achievement related tasks (Braten & Strømsø, 2004; 
Pintrich, 2000).  Goal orientation is historically broken into two categories 
including mastery and performance goals (Ames, 1984; Dweck, 1986; 
Nicholls, 1984).  Mastery goals involve engaging in a task in order to 
become competent or master a skill.  In contrast, performance goals are 
outcome focused, normative in nature, and individuals compare themselves 
to others.  A mastery goal mindset is aligned with a propensity for 
conceptual change to a greater degree than a performance approach mindset 
(Johnson & Sinatra, 2014; Linnenbrink & Pintrich, 2002).  We contend that 
having a combination of mastery and performance approaches leads to 
greater levels of determination to engage and higher levels of motivation for 
conceptual change (Pintrich, Conley, & Kempler, 2003; Senko, Hulleman, & 
Harackiewicz, 2011).    
We recognize that motivation is an incredibly complex and multifaceted 
construct and includes many more components than the three that we have 
specified in the DMCC because of the association with learner autonomy 
and determination to engage in conceptual change processes.  We chose to 
focus on these aspects of motivation because each has been documented in 
research on conceptual change in science learning (Lavigne, Vallerand, & 
Miquelon, 2007).  We recognize that other components of motivation such 
as intrinsic/extrinsic motivation, self-efficacy, and test anxiety may be 
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considered and examined to understand their contribution to conceptual 
change in science. 
 
Cognitive Engagement. Engagement is typically defined as being 
comprised of cognitive, behavioral, and affective dimensions (Fredricks, 
Blumenfeld, & Paris, 2004).  However, most of the research on conceptual 
change has focused on the cognitive aspect of engagement, with little 
examination of the affective and behavioral components of conceptual 
change.  
Within the conceptual change process represented in our model, we 
operationalize cognitive engagement as occurring when individuals 
explicitly interpret, interact with, process, and make sense of a message.  
Deep cognitive engagement results in greater propensity for conceptual 
change than shallow cognitive engagement (Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Greene, 
Dillon, &, Crynes, 2003).  In deep cognitive engagement the learner puts 
significant time and attention toward processing information about the main 
principles and underlying concepts; shallow cognitive engagement is 
typified by rote processing and simple memorization of content (Greene, 
Dillon, & Crynes, 2003).  Cognitive engagement is a mediator between 
emotions and achievement (Linnenbrink & Pintrich, 2002;; Pekrun & 
Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2012) as well as a mediating variable between 
motivation and conceptual change in science learning (Taasoobshirazi, 
Heddy, Bailey, & Farley, 2016).  In addition, deep cognitive engagement is 
associated with motivation and a mastery goal mindset (Meece, Blumenfeld, 
& Hoyle, 1988; Walker, Greene, & Mansell, 2006).  Thus, there is warrant 
for retaining cognitive engagement when modeling conceptual change. 
 
Extant Knowledge.  In alignment with the CRKM, we recognize that the 
prior knowledge that learners hold influences their interpretation and 
engagement in processing messages (Dole & Sinatra 1998; Hewson & 
Hewson, 1983).  However, we also contend that extant knowledge 
influences how learners approach conceptual change, as extant knowledge 
may enhance or hinder the commitment to conceptual change and the extent 
to which learners embrace and apply new conceptions.  Extant knowledge 
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may undermine the adoption of new conceptions and therefore, may result in 
tenuous adoption of new conceptions or outright rejection of concepts.  We 
argue that extant knowledge (or perceived understanding of phenomenon) 
may result in a desire to retain current conceptions regardless of accuracy, 
hindering the change process.  Regardless of the level, extant knowledge 
influences conceptual change and needs to be component of related models. 
 
Emotion. Emotion is an important factor that is highly influential on 
learning and motivation (Pekrun & Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2012; Pekrun, 2006; 
Pekrun & Stephens, 2012).  We define emotion as a feeling that occurs when 
individuals label their psychophysiological arousal based on their evaluation 
of a stimuli (Pekrun, Goetz, Titz, & Perry, 2002).  Emotions have a positive 
(joy, pride) or negative (anger, hopelessness) valence (Schutz & Pekrun, 
2007).  Further, emotions can be activating in that they cause physiological 
arousal (anger, joy) or deactivating (boredom, relief) in that they cause non-
arousal (Pekrun, Goetz, Frenzel, Barchfeld, Perry, 2011; Pekrun & Perry, 
2014).  Depending on the valence and activating nature of the emotion, a 
subsequent and differential impact on conceptual change may occur.  For 
instance, positive activating emotions, in the form of enjoyment, have shown 
to increase the likelihood and strength of conceptual change (Broughton, 
Sinatra, & Nussbaum, 2013; Heddy & Sinatra, 2013).  Related, evidence 
exists which suggests that a decrease in negative emotions can be influential 
in conceptual change (Heddy, Sinatra, Danielson, & Graham, 2017).  
Although several models discuss the impact that affect can have on 
conceptual change (Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Gregoire, 2003; Murphy, 2007), 
these models refer to affect, rather than emotion. Strong evidence exists 
supporting the relationship between conceptual change and emotion and we 
represent that in our model by separating emotion from other elements of 
affect and describing its unique predictive power on the conceptual change 
process. 
 Gregoire (2003) argues, emotional responses are triggered prior to 
engaging with the message and “as part of the appraisal process, serve as 
additional information for individuals as they interact with a complex, 
stressful message” (p. 168).  Gregoire postulates that negative emotions are 
likely to promote engaging in systematic, deep processing of the message, 
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while positive emotions may lead to shallow engagement with processing of 
the message.  While the CAMCC (Gregoire, 2003) conflicts with other 
explanations that suggest negative emotions may impede critical thinking 
and metacognition (Linnenbrink & Pintrich, 2002; Pekrun & Perry, 2014), 
the model does attend to the influence that emotions can have on conceptual 
change.   
An initial foray into empirically documenting the relationship between 
emotions and conceptual change was conducted by Broughton and 
colleagues (2013).  An important finding from the study was that students’ 
negative emotions could be tempered through instruction, including small 
group discussion and debate, thus increasing the likelihood of conceptual 
change.  Given the evidence there is support for expanding the role that 
emotions play in conceptual change, which support including the construct 
in the DMCC. 
 
DMCC Elements Not Included in Extant Conceptual Change Models 
 
Epistemological beliefs. Epistemological beliefs, or beliefs about the nature 
of knowledge and knowing (Hofer 2000; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Kuhn, 
Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000), have been shown to influence conceptual 
change (Kuhn, Cheney & Weinstock, 2000; Mason & Gava, 2007).  A 
learner may be drawn upon epistemic beliefs when presented with 
information that conflicts with her/his prior beliefs and is faced with 
grappling with the ideas to make sense of them (Sinatra, Kienhues, & Hofer, 
2014; Sinatra & Mason, 2013).  Conceptual change is more likely to occur 
among learners who hold beliefs that knowledge is complex rather than 
simple and information is fluid rather than static (Qian & Alvermann, 1995; 
Windschitl & Andre, 1998).   
Holding perceptions of science knowledge as tentative is crucial to 
conceptual change as learners with the perception are more likely to consider 
new information that challenges existing knowledge (Nadelson & Sinatra, 
2010; Nadelson & Viskupic, 2010; Sinatra & Mason, 2013).  Young 
students often hold dualist epistemic beliefs related to science, including the 
notion that science knowledge is unchanging and true and there is only one 
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correct answer, which hinders their ability to distinguish between evidence 
and knowledge (Khishfe & Abd-El-Khalick, 2002).  Similarly, young 
students often believe that information contained in science textbooks is 
absolute truth, and science knowledge is static, fixed, and transmitted by 
authorities (Bell & Linn, 2002; Mason & Gava, 2007; Conley et al., 2004).  
Such perceptions are likely to hinder the determination of young students to 
consider conflicting messages and therefore will likely hinder their 
engagement in conceptual change. 
Individuals who hold the view that scientists make decisions based on 
empirical evidenced claims and confirmed with rational arguments may be 
more likely to critically consider new information that conflicts with their 
prior knowledge (Broughton, et al., 2013; Sinatra et al., 2014).  Thus, there 
is justification for considering epistemic beliefs when examining conceptual 
change.  
Attitudes. In addition to emotion, attitude is an important component to 
include when designing a model of concept change.  Attitudes can influence 
cognition, affect, and behavior (Hynd, 2003; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  
Attitudes are defined as an overall evaluation of an attitude object (person, 
place, event, or topic), and are described as a positive or negative valence of 
liking or disliking (Eagly & Chaiken, 1995; Frey, 1986; Holbrook, Berent, 
Krosnick, Visser, & Boninger, 2005; Maio, Haddock, & Spears, 2010).  
Attitude has been shown to have an impact on learning and conceptual 
change in previous research (Broughton et al., 2013; Heddy, Sinatra, 
Danielson, & Graham, 2017).  Specifically, research shows that our attitudes 
influence what kind of information we seek out and how the information is 
processed (Frey, 1986; Holbrook, Berent, Krosnick, Visser, & Boninger, 
2005). That is, instead of perceiving incoming information objectively, 
humans use their attitudes as a lens to encode and interpret (and perhaps 
judge) information (Maio, Haddock, & Spears, 2010).   
Moreover, attitudes influence the extent to which people actually 
remember information (Eagly, Chen, Chaiken, & Shaw-Barnes, 1999).  In 
their exploration of the inseparability of attitude and conceptual change, 
Sinatra and Seyranian (2015) theorize that individuals have either accurate 
or inaccurate knowledge in addition to positive or negative valence attitudes.  
Hence, how individuals engage in the conceptual change process is based on 
166 Nadelson, Heddy, Jones, Taasoobshirazi & Johnson– Dynamic 
Model of Conceptual Change 
 
 
the valence of their attitude.  For instance, if someone has a negative 
attitude, conceptual change is unlikely (Sinatra, Kienhous, & Hofer, 2014).  
Based on this prior research we argue that attitude is an essential component 
of conceptual change. 
 In our model attitude influences determination to express or activate 
multiple personal variables including:  1) motivation, 2) emotions, 3) 
personally epistemology, and 4) behavior.  First, attitude directly and 
indirectly impacts motivation to engage in multiple stages of conceptual 
change from message consideration to conceptual change (Holbrook, Berent, 
Krosnick, Visser, & Boninger, 2005).  Social influences, such as cultural 
norms, have been shown to impact our attitudes and thus will have a 
significant impact on conceptual change.  Second, emotions are an 
expression of attitudes and evidence exists that suggest initial emotions drive 
attitudes (Petty & Brinol, 2015), and both will have a subsequent impact on 
conceptual change (Heddy, Sinatra, Danielson, & Graham, 2017).  Third, 
personal epistemologies are essentially attitudes and beliefs related to 
individual’s perceptions of knowledge and how learning occurs (Hofer & 
Pintrich, 2004; Muis, Bendixen, & Haerle, 2006), which impacts conceptual 
change (Taasoobshirazi & Sinatra, 2011).  Fourth, attitudes impact behavior 
in such a way that people persist through challenges in learning and remain 
resilient in their engagement based on their attitude toward the topic (Frey, 
1986; Koestner, Bernieri, & Zuckerman, 1992).  Within each of these 
components, attitude influences determination to engage in message 
consideration, message processing, and embracing conceptual change. 
Attention Allocation.  Attention allocation of the learner to key 
segments of a message is an additional variable linked to conceptual change.  
Previous models of conceptual change (e.g., Dole & Sinatra, 1998) have not 
explicitly addressed the role of attention allocation, though researchers have 
used cognitive engagement as a proxy for attention allocation (Broughton et 
al., 2010).  However, researchers have demonstrated that attention allocation 
is distinct and has a differential effect than engagement during conceptual 
change processes (Jones, Johnson, & Campbell, 2015).   
Attention allocation in association with conceptual change has been 
documented in the refutation text literature. Refutation text begins by stating 
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a common misconception and then directly and explicitly refutes that 
misconception, followed by a coherent description of the accepted scientific 
viewpoint (Hynd, 2001; Mason, Gava, & Boldrin, 2008).  Jones and 
colleagues (2015) report both task value and attention allocation had a direct 
effect on cognitive engagement, which in turn, predicted conceptual change.  
Refutation text promotion of conceptual change is attributed to the attention 
allocation (in working memory) of the reader to his/her misconception along 
with the new conception which extend beyond engagement (Ariasi & 
Mason, 2014; Kendeou, Walsh, Smith, & O’Brien, 2014; Kendeou & van 
den Broek, 2005, 2007; van den Broek & Kendeou, 2008; van den Broek, 
Young, Tzeng, & Linderholm, 1999).  Considered together, these studies 
indicate that as learners allocate increased attention to a message they are 
likely to experience conceptual change.  Thus, we argue that attention 
allocation is a critical construct to consider in the conceptual change process 
because what information the learner chooses to focus on can influence the 
likelihood of conceptual change occurring.  
Social and Cultural influences.  Social and cultural context has been 
largely ignored in much conceptual change literature, which is unfortunate 
given the significant impact that societal and cultural norms have on learning 
(Gay, 2002; Nadelson & Hardy, 2015; Rueda, 2010).  The extant models of 
conceptual change that we have described have not included cultural and 
social influences.  Hence, a critical component of the DMCC is 
acknowledgment of the integral impact that societal and cultural context has 
on the change process.  Pintrich and colleagues (1993) argued that the 
classroom community social context must be considered when 
hypothesizing predictors of conceptual change.  In addition, teachers and 
peers can greatly influence conceptual change (Beeth, 1993; Beeth & 
Hewson, 1999; Hewson & Thorley, 1989).   
Instructors who integrate controversial and meaningful discussion in their 
instruction such as having students critically evaluate ideas from different 
cultures and societies and making judgments about ideas using evidence 
(Nussbaum & Sinatra, 2003) can more effectively support their students’ 
positive attitudes, engagement, and conceptual change (e.g., Broughton, 
Sinatra, & Nussbaum, 2013).  In addition to instruction and teacher 
influence, peer influences such as conformity impacts message consideration 
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(Hardy, 1957; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), which could impact conceptual 
change. 
Beyond the classroom and peer influence, other cultural and societal 
structures should be considered when examining conceptual change such as 
family, congregation, museums, community events, organizations, 
neighbors, and media (Kelly & Green, 1998; Taasoobshirazi et. al, 2016).  
While there has been some exploration of social and cultural influences on 
conceptual perspectives in science, there is a need for deeper examination of 
how changing social or cultural contexts influences determination to engage 
in conceptual change processes. In recognition of social and cultural 
influences, we have included society and culture in our model as they are 
essential when explaining conceptual change and provide a direction for 
needed research. 
 Behavioral and Affective Engagement.  Generally, three dimensions 
of engagement are accepted in the literature including cognitive, behavioral, 
and affective (Fredricks, Blumenfeld, & Paris, 2004).  In previous models, 
only cognitive engagement has been included (Dole & Sinatra, 1998).  In our 
model, we recognize all three aspects of engagement as integral aspects of 
the conceptual change process.  Given that we have described cognitive 
engagement, we now define behavioral and affective engagement.  
Behavioral engagement is viewed as the actions linked with cognitive 
engagement such as persistence, attention, knowledge seeking, and self-
regulation (Finn & Zimmer, 2012) and is considered vital for achieving 
positive learning outcomes (Fredricks, Blumenfeld, & Paris, 2004).  
Behavioral engagement is represented in our model by behaviors, practices, 
and resilience.  Affective engagement is defined as the level of emotional 
response characterized by feelings of involvement with the concept to be 
learned (Finn & Zimmer, 2012).  Affective engagement has been shown to 
impact conceptual change (Broughton et al., 2013; Heddy & Sinatra, 2013).  
In our model, learners who thoughtfully and critically weigh new 
information with respect to their prior knowledge are likely to seek 
additional information and self-regulate their learning.  We maintain that 
those who have a positive affect and embrace knowledge seeking behaviors 
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will engage deeper in learning and experience have a higher propensity for 
conceptual change. 
 
The Dynamic Model of Conceptual Change 
 
Growing awareness and understanding of the predictors of conceptual 
change underscore the necessity for a new comprehensive model of 
conceptual change.  While conceptual change models such as the CRKM 
(Dole & Sinatra, 1998), CAMCC (Gregoire, 2003), BAKCF (Murphy, 
2007), and P-Prims (diSessa, 1993) have been highly influential, a 
substantial amount of research has been conducted in the 20 plus years since 
their development.  Current models are missing the influence of emotion 
(Broughton et al., 2013; Taasoobshirazi et al., 2016), epistemological belief 
(Kuhn, Cheney & Weinstock, 2000; Mason & Gava, 2007), as well as 
culture and society (Costa, 1995), The existing conceptual change models 
are recursive in nature, whereas most researchers agree that 
cognitive/motivational processes are non-recursive (Bronfenbrenner, 2004).  
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that conceptual change is not the 
supplanting of conceptions, but the suppression of coexisting conceptions 
amid the development of more cogent conceptual models (Shtulman, 2009; 
Shtulman & Valcarcel 2012).   
To address the limitations of extant models of conceptual change in light 
of the evolving understanding of the influences on conceptual change, we 
designed the Dynamic Model of Conceptual Change.  Our model 
development was informed by the progress of conceptual change research, 
posited predictive influences, and deeper understanding of the contextual or 
potentially situational nature of conceptual change.  
The basic framework for the Dynamic Model of Conceptual Change 
(DMCC) is based on four essential stages: 1) the message, 2) learner 
recognition and consideration of the message, 3) learner engagement with 
processing the message, and 4) conceptual change (see Figure 1).  In the 
DMCC, the stages of learner recognition and consideration of the message, 
engagement in processing the message, and conceptual change, are self-
regulated by the learner and influenced by the learner’s motivation, society, 
culture, emotions, personal epistemology, extant knowledge, attention 
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allocation, and personal behaviors and practices.  In the DMCC we have 
included avenues for advancing, regressing and disengaging at each stage of 
the conceptual change process, again, considerations that have not be part of 
existing conceptual change models (See Figure 1). 
 
Conceptual Framework for the DMCC: Self Determination 
We have chosen self-determination (Ryan & Deci, 2009) as a conceptual 
framework for the DMCC due to the emphasis on autonomy.  The 
perception we have of motivation and the idea of volition and independence 
of learners in conceptual change make self-determination a useful 
framework for conceptualizing the DMCC.  In the development of DMCC 
we took into account the choices that individuals make in terms of attending 
to, processing, interpreting and accepting messages associated with 
conceptual change.  We included provisions for choice to exit the conceptual 
change process at multiple stages, as well as recurse to prior stages in a 
dynamic manner, conditions which are expressive of autonomy and self-
determined learning (Ryan & Deci, 2008, 2009).  In our model we included 
both personal variables (e.g. emotions, behaviors, personal epistemology) 
and environmental variables (e.g. society, culture, community), which can be 
determined based on personal choice.  Given the recognition of individual 
choice or autonomy in facets of level of engagement, expression of 
personality, and attention to external influences in the conceptual change 
process, the DMCC is well conceptualized through the lens of self-
determination. 
 
The DMCC as a Dynamic Model 
Dynamic models are created to describe processes such as decision making, 
to reflect the influence of multiple inputs or components, and make 
predictions about outcomes (Brehmer, 1992; Gonzalez, Lerch & Lebiere, 
2003), conditions that are integral to the DMCC.  Dynamic models are used 
to describe human thinking and decision making and account for the 
interactions of multiple components involved (e.g. choice, judgement, 
recognition) and possible outcomes of reasoning, and to make predictions 
based on the possible paths taken in the system to come to a decision (e.g. 
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Gonzalez, Lerch & Lebiere, 2003). Conceptual change as reflected in the 
DMCC could be described through a dynamic model that is nonlinear/non-
recursive with multidirectional interactions, sensitive to changes in emotion, 
behaviors, motivation and a host of other influences, contextual and 






















Figure 1: The Dynamic Model of Conceptual Change or DMCC. 
 
 
Stage 1: The Message  
In the DMCC we recognize that messages that may be considered and 
possibly lead to conceptual change are external to the individual.  We argue 
that the message is not within the individual’s working memory until the 
learner acknowledges and engages with the message.  Thus, if learners 
disregard a message, there will be no conceptual change.  Drawing from the 
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CRKM (Dole & Sinatra, 1998), we perceive that messages may come to the 
learner through observation, activities or experiences, interactions with 
others, or reading text.   
 
Stage 2: Message Recognition and Consideration 
Only when an individual recognizes and considers a message does the 
message become internal to the learner.  Influences on learner consideration 
of and decision to process a message may be due to the source of the 
message, the credibility of the message, the content of the message (e.g. is 
the message compelling), the coherency of the message, the potential 
usefulness of the message, and the plausibility of the message (Lombardi, 
Sinatra, &, Nussbaum, 2013).   
As reflected in the DMCC, we posit that learners rely on an array of 
personal elements that influence their consideration and engagement with a 
message.  This includes the context in which the message is presented 
(Brown, Collins, and Duguid, 1989) and the learner’s emotions (Pekrun, 
1992), personal epistemology (Kendeou, Braasch, & Braten, 2015), prior 
knowledge (McNamara & Kintsch, 1996), motivation (Pintrich et al., 1993), 
and attention allocation (Shirey & Reynolds, 1988).  In the DMCC we 
recognize that the extent of learner message consideration can vary from 
simple recognition and then disregard (resulting in no further processing and 
disengagement), to deep consideration (resulting in extensive engagement in 
message processing).  If the learner does consider (and does not disregard) 
the message, then s/he progresses to the next stage of the DMCC - 
engagement with the message.   
 
Stage 3: Engagement in Message Processing, Contemplation, and Sense 
Making 
In the DMCC, we consider engagement as being the stage in the conceptual 
change process in which learners contemplate, mentally test, and attempt to 
make sense of a message.  Again, we maintain that an array of personal and 
external variables influence determination to engage and contemplate with 
the message.  Engagement in the DMCC includes cognitive, affective, and 
behavioral elements (Fredricks et al., 2004; Sinatra, Heddy, & Lombardi, 
IJEP – International Journal of Educational Psychology, 7(2)   173 
 
 
2015).  Each dimension of engagement is suspected to overlap in such a way 
that assessing one dimension without also assessing the others is improbable 
and incomplete (Sinatra, Heddy, & Lombardi, 2015).  Although the focus in 
conceptual change has been on the cognitive processing of messages, it is 
also important to consider behavioral and affective processing to make a 
trustworthy claim on the impact that individual engagement in the process 
has on conceptual change.  
As with message consideration, we recognize in the DMCC the potential 
for varying degrees or depth of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral 
engagement, from long-term, deep processing to short-term shallow 
processing.  Individuals have tremendous autonomy in their determination of 
their desired level of engagement.  In the DMCC we recognize the interplay 
of the personal and external variables that influence individual motivation 
and determination to contemplate and explore a message in terms of value, 
cost, relevance and goals.  If the determination is the message is of low 
personal value, usefulness, or does not meet individual goals the learner is 
likely to disengage and exit.  However, if the message is of high personal 
value, usefulness, or does meet personal goals the learner is likely to deeply 
engage and transition to conceptual change. 
 
Stage 4: Conceptual Change: Possible Outcomes 
At the conceptual change stage of the DMCC, we continue to recognize the 
influence of the same array of personal and external elements that influence 
learners’ determination to consider and engagement in processing the 
message.  We propose that there is a spectrum of possible conceptual change 
outcomes.  At one end of the spectrum is the formation of a new conception 
with no acceptance, resulting in a dormant conception and the retention of 
the original conception as dominant.  In this case, the student comprehends 
the idea (e.g., student reads and understands a newspaper article that 
describes that much of global warming is a result of humans putting too 
much carbon in the atmosphere), but does not accept or agree with the idea 
(e.g., evidence does not complement their strongly held political beliefs or 
their personal experiences) (e.g., Lombardi & Sinatra, 2012).  There is 
formation of a new conception as the information was processed, but the 
conception is dormant and the original conception remains dominant. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, enduring transformation, learners 
“understand, accept, and actively commit” to the new concept.  At this level 
of conceptual change, the learner understands the new concept, accepts the 
premises of the concept and is so actively committed to the idea such that 
there are changes in life style, behaviors and actions (e.g. understands and 
accepts climate change and begins to take steps to lower carbon footprint 
through conservation activities).   
Between the two extremes of the spectrum, but closer to “understanding 
and no acceptance,” is tenuous consideration, which includes outcomes such 
as understanding, acceptance, and tenuous commitment.  In these cases, a 
learner may understand and accept a new idea, but that acceptance is 
constricted resulting in fragile or tenuous commitment to the new 
conception.  As a result, an individual with tenuous commitment will not 
likely be resilient or resistant to the possible consideration of conflicting 
messages or with time regress to her/his original conception (e.g. initially 
understands and accepts the idea of human induced climate change but may 
switch back to original misconception when faced with conflicting 
information or with the passing of time).  Thus, individuals with tenuous 
commitment are unlikely to adopt changes in behaviors or find value in the 
new conception.  Further, the tenuous commitment is likely to be subject to 
partial consideration or heuristic application. 
More toward the “active commitment” end of the conceptual change 
spectrum is passive accommodation, which includes the possible outcomes 
of understanding, acceptance, and commitment, in which a student accepts 
and is committed to a conception, but this conceptual change does not 
translate to notable changes in behavior (e.g., understanding and fully 
agreeing that a large part of climate change is human induced, but not 
making changes to one’s lifestyle such as recycling or carpooling) (Sinatra, 
Kardash, Taasoobshirazi, & Lombardi, 2012).  At this level, the conceptual 
change is more stable over time and less susceptible to be disregarded in 
place of original conceptions.   
 
Dynamic Paths and Exit Points 
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We expect that students can move from a less (or more) committed level of 
conceptual change to a more (or less) committed level due to time, 
instruction, and/or, the array of personal factors that also influence message 
consideration and engagement (Carey, 1985).  Thus, in the DMCC we have 
included a dynamic path to cycle back and forth between stages in the 
process of engaging in message recognition, consideration, processing, and 
acceptance.  We have also provided pathways for disengagement at each 
stage of the DMCC in recognition that individuals based on the array of 
personal and external influences on determine they are not interested in 
engaging in message recognition, consideration, processing, and acceptance.  
 
Empirically Studying the DMCC 
 
Components of the theoretical DMCC should continue to be empirically 
studied.  In order to study conceptual change, we first need to ensure that we 
have valid and reliable methods for measuring the variables implicated in 
contributing to conceptual change.  There are valid, reliable, and widely used 
instruments for assessing many of the variables in the DMCC including 
motivation (e.g., Glynn et al., 2007; Pintrich, Smith, Garcia, & McKeachie, 
1993), emotions (Broughton et al., 2013; Pekrun et al., 2011), epistemic 
beliefs (e.g., Schommer-Aikins, Duell, & Hutter, 2005; Schraw, Bendixen, 
& Dunkle, 2002), persistence (Miller, Greene, Montalvo, Ravindran & 
Nichols, 1996), academic buoyancy (Martin & Marsh, 2007), and resilience 
(Duckworth & Quinn, 2009).   
Other variables in the model may need to be assessed using researcher 
developed items (e.g., extant knowledge, attention allocation), or 
instruments may exist that need some refinement before use.  For example, 
engagement is a major component of the DMCC, however, there have been 
concerns regarding the validity of the most widely used instrument used to 
assess engagement (e.g., the Approaches to Learning Instrument, Greene, 
Miller, Crowson, Duke, & Akey, 2004).  One main concern regarding the 
instrument is that it only assesses cognitive engagement, which is only one 
component of engagement (Greene, 2015).  Engagement is hypothesized to 
have three components including cognitive, affective, and behavioral 
(Fredricks, Blumenfeld, & Paris, 2004). The Approach to Learning 
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Instrument should be revised to consider all three aspects of engagement that 
are considered in the DMCC.  Similarly, other extant instruments may need 
to be modified to effectively gather the data necessary to empirically 
document the DMCC.  We encourage researchers to continue to develop, 
validate, and psychometrically assess tools to measure the variables of 
conceptual change included in the DMCC.  In addition, we recognize the 
value in refining existing instruments to effectively measure conceptual 
change as predicted by the DMCC.   
There are advanced statistical multivariate, nested, and growth modeling 
techniques available today and data analysis software (e.g., Mplus, R, 
AMOS) make complex and dynamic model analysis relatively easy to 
conduct and interpret.  We encourage researchers to consider these methods 
and tools to test how personal and external variables described in the DMCC 
interact to influence conceptual change.   
There are a variety of methods and approaches to analysis that could be 
leveraged to explore the predictive properties and accuracy of the DMCC as 
a mode for conceptual change.  Researchers have already begun to use 
structural equation modeling to examine how various conceptual change 
variables interact directly and indirectly to result in conceptual change in 
science (Jones, et al., 2015).  The structure equation models may be used to 
determine which variables in the DMCC might be most or least influential or 
predictive of engagement and outcomes of the conceptual change process.  
To examine and understand how the DMCC aligns with how conceptions 
change over time researchers should consider growth models.  Researchers 
seeking to examine how the DMCC predicts conceptual change for different 
types of students depending on their social and instructional context might 
rely on hierarchically structured data, or nested data analysis.  Cluster 
analysis may be used to determine how various profiles of students are 
accounted for by the DMCC.  To gain a deeper understanding about the 
influence of the variables in the DMCC and how they interact during 
conceptual change researchers could conduct comprehensive, qualitative 
interviews (Patton, 2002).  Using a mixed methods approach would likely 
provide a detailed picture of how the DMCC pathways and variable 
structures interact during conceptual change.  Fruitful research examining 
IJEP – International Journal of Educational Psychology, 7(2)   177 
 
 
the DMCC may involve the use of concept maps, exploratory factor 
analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, item response theory, and Rasch 
modeling.  Regardless of the method or approach, empirically supporting the 
DMCC will lead to creative approaches to examining the interplay of 
variables during conceptual change. 
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
We urge researchers to use the DMCC to holistically comprehend and assess 
conceptual change.  In the development of the DMCC we examined more 
than 30 years of theoretical and empirical work on conceptual change and 
the numerous research studies that support or refute components of the 
extant conceptual change models.  For example, there is clear evidence that 
motivation (Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle, 1993), personal relevance (Heddy & 
Sinatra, 2013), and plausibility (Lombardi & Sinatra, 2013) impact 
conceptual change.  In contrast, studies on need for cognition and 
engagement (Heddy & Sinatra, 2013; Taasoobshirazi & Sinatra, 2011;  
Taasoobshirazi et al., 2016) have produced mixed results suggesting 
complex interactions with other variables or a need for more refined research 
tools and methods. 
Empirical tests of the DMCC, which provide exhaustive examination of 
the variables implicated in contributing to conceptual change, can help 
researchers determine which variables are most influential on conceptual 
change when multiple variables are under consideration.  Furthermore, 
motivation is an umbrella term that includes multiple sub-constructs (Glynn 
et al., 2007, 2011).  Exploring how each of these sub-constructs impact 
conceptual change separately would provide a more comprehensive 
explanation of how motivation influences conceptual change.  
One possible direction for research is examining the reasons students exit 
from the conceptual change process.  Such a direction of research may 
provide insight into justification for disregarding a message or 
disengagement due to personal or external variables.  By studying 
disengagement, we could gather empirical evidence for the exit points of 
conceptual change and the variables impacting these exits.  A mixed 
methods approach is likely to be the most effective for examining 
disengagement during the conceptual change process. 
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We also encourage researches to study DMCC variables across different 
conceptual change topics and contexts.  For example, students have been 
shown to hold misconceptions in social studies (Alongi, Heddy, & Sinatra, 
2016; Limon, 2002), social and behavioral sciences (Kuhle, Barber, & 
Bristol, 2009; Lilienfeld, Lynn, Ruscio, & Beyerstein, 2010), mathematics 
(Kuncar & Breigheith, 2002), and kinesiology (Brown & Vescovi, 2012; 
Manini, Druger, & Ploutz-Snyder, 2005).  Researchers should explore if the 
DMCC functions in a similar fashion across different domains, topics and 
contexts.  Thus, the DMCC may provide the framework necessary to 
promote research on conceptual change when students are presented with 




The DMCC illustrates conceptual change as an ongoing process, as opposed 
to a stationary endpoint, meaning educators can and should conceptualize 
the facilitation of conceptual change in a manner that is ongoing, and not a 
one-time exercise.  A practical aspect of the DMCC is how realistic, 
contemporary, and inclusive it is in design; allowing for it to be applied in 
diverse learning environments and contexts.  Conceptual change is by no 
means easy to facilitate or maintain, and while we have highlighted above 
numerous studies reporting evidence concerning successful interventions 
that have resulted in conceptual change, we also acknowledge that there are 
many exit points in the conceptual change process and potential for 
regression.  Thus, in the DMCC there are points throughout the conceptual 
change process where a learner may not advance in changing their 
conceptual understanding of a phenomenon, and instead regress and/or 
disengage in the conceptual change process.  Furthermore, we maintain that 
learners do not completely abandon their prior conceptions even when 
conceptual change has occurred.  So, what this means for educators, is that 
conceptual change is not guaranteed, nor is it always an end point.  
Educators should not be discouraged by their initial attempts to facilitate 
conceptual change if it is not completely successful, and instead consider the 
conceptual change process as ongoing and dynamic.  Learners’ prior 
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conceptions not being lost forever even when conceptual change has 
occurred is potentially advantageous to educators.  Teachers may consider 
utilizing learner retention of prior conceptions to occasionally remind 
learners of their previous (maybe weak) conceptions and compare them to 
their current (hopefully dominant/appropriate) conceptions to illustrate to 
their students their growth and development in learning. 
Our proposal of a spectrum of conceptual change from no conceptual 
change (new conception formed but not accepted) to enduring 
transformation (understand, accept, and actively commit) should also be 
highlighted to practitioners and educators interested in facilitating 
conceptual change.  For assessment and evaluation purposes, educators 
should consider where on the conceptual change spectrum they would like 
their students to reach.  For some conceptual learning contexts, it may be 
sufficient that learners only need to reach understanding but no acceptance, 
particularly when working with potentially controversial topics in which 
pressuring students into accepting and active commitment to a conceptual 
understanding of a phenomenon may be perceived to be unethical.  
Finally, we want to reiterate that teachers and peer influence can greatly 
impact conceptual change.  Keeping in mind that cultural and societal 
influences matter, there are actions that educators can do to establish, foster, 
and maintain a learning environment conducive to conceptual change 
learning.  Strike and Posner (1992) acknowledged that conceptual change is 
not a rational or linear process as they had initially proposed, and that 
learners’ conceptual ecology needs consideration.  
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